Rural politics: Do sarpanches favour some constituents over others?

In 1992, India conducted the world’s largest experiment in local democracy. The 73rd amendment to the Indian Constitution, passed that year, devolved substantial authority over policy implementation to millions of elected local politicians across rural India.

As a result, village politicians gained power over the targeting of benefits from government programmes, such as the allocation of jobs in the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme. The amendment also brought the government much closer to villagers, giving them direct access to representatives of the state, who now had the power to solve their problems.

A critical question for understanding the consequences of this decentralisation effort is one of priorities. Who do elected local leaders – particularly sarpanches, who head the lowest tier of rural government – favour when responding to everyday requests?

Specifically, do they set out to represent the often-diverse coalition of voters who elected them, or do they favour narrow groups of voters from their own ethnic group? Similarly, given that surveys show elected village officials are overwhelmingly likely to know their constituents personally – and therefore expected to be aware of the neediest members of the village – do they prioritise the needy over better-off voters?

Caste and class

To better understand sarpanches’ targeting decisions, I conducted fieldwork...

Read more